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1
INTRODUCTION
The most widely-used intervention in Organizational Behavior Management
(OBM) has been and continues to be performance feedback. Reviews of the OBM
literature have found that feedback, by itself or in combination with other elements such
as goal setting or incentives, has been used in 65% - 70% of interventions (Balcazar,
Shupert, Daniels, Mawhinney, & Hopkins, 1989; Bucklin, Alvero, Dickinson, Austin, &
Jackson, 2000; Nolan, Jarema, & Austin, 1999). Considered to be one of the least
understood of all OBM interventions, performance feedback has been defined in several
different ways. For example, feedback has been defined as (a) information given to
individuals regarding the quantity or quality of their past performance (Prue & Fairbank,
1981), (b) "information about performance that allows an individual to adjust his or her
performance" (Daniels, 2000, p. 101), and (c) information transmitted back to the
responder following a particular performance (Sulzer-Azaroff & Mayer, 1991).
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, research on performance feedback
has resulted in conflicting interpretations of the function(s) of feedback, as well as the
conditions under which it works (Balcazar, Hopkins, & Suarez, 1985-86; Ilgen, Fisher, &
Taylor, 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Kopelman, 1986). For example, it has been
suggested that feedback functions as (a) a discriminative stimulus, (b) a conditioned
reinforcer, and (c) an establishing operation (Balcazar et al., 1985-86; Bucklin, McGee,
& Dickinson, 2003; Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1985-86; Peterson, 1982). Despite the
differences in conceptual interpretations and mixed results of feedback studies, the
positive effects of performance feedback have been well-documented (for reviews, see
Alvero, Bucklin, & Austin, 2001; Balcazar et al., 1985-86; Kopelman, 1986).
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When used, performance feedback is typically delivered by managers or
supervisors (Balcazar et al., 1985-86). Feedback source has been identified as a
significant factor in the use of performance feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979); however,
research has suggested differential effects of various sources of feedback, including the
organization, managers/supervisors, coworkers, the task itself, and the individual (e.g.,
Greller, 1980; Greller & Herold, 1975). Through the use of technology, Earley (1988)
assessed the delivery of computer-generated feedback via a computer-tracking
mechanism that automatically monitored performance accomplishments of individual
performers. Earley found increases in performance when individuals generated feedback
on their performance via the computer-tracking system (i.e., self-generated feedback)
versus when feedback was delivered by the individual's supervisor (i.e., supervisorprovided feedback). Additionally, Kluger and Adler (1993) found that participants in
their laboratory study were more likely to seek feedback from a computer than from a
person.
Similar to this, Electronic Performance Monitoring (EPM) has become another
common method for monitoring employee performance as new computer technology is
introduced in the workplace (Mallo, Nordstrom, Battels, & Traxler, 2007). EPM has been
defined by the United States Office of Technology Assessment as "the continuous,
computerized collection, storage, analysis and reporting of employee production
activities" (Mallo et al., p.50). Familiar examples of work activities observed through the
use of EPM include monitoring and reviewing telephone conversations and recording
time spent, content reviewed, and keystrokes entered on individual computer
workstations (Smith, Carayon, Sanders, Lim, & LeGrande, 1992). Schleifer and Shell
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(1992) contend that EPM has advantages for employees, including the ability to provide
timely feedback on individual performance. The recent introduction of EPM systems in
the workplace, coupled with the results of Earley (1988) and Kluger and Adler (1993),
lend support for the use of computer-based tracking systems as a source of performance
feedback.
Northcraft and Earley (1989) evaluated the impact of different feedback sources
on the credibility of feedback, strategy acquisition, and performance in a stock market
simulation. Four feedback sources were compared: (a) organization — feedback was
delivered impersonally, (b) supervisor - feedback was delivered verbally and in written
form by a professor, (c) computer-generated - self-generated by the individual with the
use of a computer, and (d) self-generated - without the use of a computer. In their study,
performance, along with credibility of feedback and strategy acquisition, was higher
under both the computer-generated and self-generated feedback conditions. These results
lend further support for the use of technology (i.e., computers) as a feedback source and
advocate the involvement of individuals in feedback generation.
Both Earley (1988) and Northcraft and Earley (1989) described their feedback
procedure as self-generated or computer-generated, indicating that the "feedback was
self-generated by the worker using the computer system" (Earley, p. 50). Unfortunately,
they did not describe the feedback generation procedure in detail. In their discussion,
Northcraft and Earley suggested that future research should examine feedback received
passively from the computer (e.g., allowing a performer to use a computer to simply
display or retrieve - rather than generate - feedback). Only one subsequent study that

4
directly evaluated the effects of passively retrieved feedback was found (Kluger & Adler,
1993); no studies that examined self-generated computer feedback were found either.
For purposes of the present study, the form of feedback to which Northcraft and
Earley (1989) alluded will be described as self-solicitedfeedback, whereby an individual
is able to obtain immediate feedback on his or her performance at any given time. The
present review of the literature failed to uncover any studies that evaluated factors that
might influence an individual to self-solicit performance feedback. Given the widespread
use of performance feedback in OBM interventions, evaluation of self-solicited feedback
seems warranted with respect to the conditions under which feedback will be solicited,
along with the effects of self-solicited feedback on performance.
Performance Feedback
In their review often years of articles in four major journals, Balcazar et al.
(1985-86) found that feedback had consistent effects in 41% of the studies evaluated.
Feedback was considered to have consistent effects "when it uniformly produced desired
mean increases or decreases of performance compared with mean baseline levels and/or
levels produced by any other independent variable(s)" (p.67). Consistent effects were
found in 52% of the articles when performance feedback was combined with other
behavioral consequences such as monetary incentives and praise. A more recent review
of feedback by Alvero et al. (2001) found that feedback paired with behavioral
consequences had consistent effects in 58% of the articles assessed.
Balcazar et al. (1985-86) identified eleven different sources of feedback (i.e., "the
individual or device that presented the information to the performer," p.68) and found
consistent effects of feedback in 50% (N = 27) of articles reviewed when the source of
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that feedback was a supervisor or manager. Alvero et al. (2001) found slightly higher
consistent effects (59%) when supervisors or managers were the feedback source. Selfgenerated feedback has been defined as when an individual uses a self-recording
procedure to record performance (Alvero et al; Balcazar et al.) and was found to have
consistent effects on performance in 21% (Balcazar et al.) and 50% (Alvero et al.) of
articles reviewed. Balcazar et al. also found that the combination of supervisor and selfgenerated feedback had consistent and mixed effects in 31% and 56% of studies
reviewed, respectively. Alvero et al. found mixed effects of the combination of
supervisor and self-generated feedback in the one article evaluated in their review.
Self-generated feedback appears to be related to self-solicited feedback with
regard to the individual's ability to obtain feedback on his or her own performance. Selfgenerated feedback would appear to be considered an active (i.e., higher response effort)
method for obtaining feedback, whereas self-solicited feedback might be a more/passive
(i.e., lower response effort) approach to attain feedback because individuals are not selfrecording their performance; rather, performance is recorded using a computer-tracking
mechanism. With both self-generated and self-solicited forms of feedback, however, the
individual has the option to decide whether and when they view the feedback. Although
research has evaluated the effects of self-generated forms of feedback on performance, no
studies were found that evaluated why or under what conditions individuals engaged in
the response of self-generating feedback.
Monetary Incentives
The prevalence of individual incentive and pay-for-performance programs within
the business industry continues to rise. According to a series of surveys conducted in the
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late 1980s and early 1990s, about 90% of Fortune 100 companies used some type of
individual incentive plan (Ledford, Lawler, & Mohrman, 1995). Specifically, Peck
(1990) reported that approximately 35% of U.S. companies used individual monetary
incentive programs to pay their employees. Monetary incentive, or pay-for-performance,
programs are especially prominent within the health care industry, with more than half of
commercial health maintenance organizations using these programs (Rosenthal, Landon,
Normand, Frank, & Epstein, 2006).
In comparison to hourly pay, monetary incentives have consistently been shown
to increase performance (for reviews, see Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Dickinson &
Gillette, 1993; Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998). However, frequent performance
feedback was available in many of the studies reviewed by Bucklin and Dickinson.
Although research has demonstrated that monetary incentives can enhance the
effectiveness of feedback (Bucklin et al., 2003), research has not yet demonstrated
whether feedback enhances incented performance.
Bucklin et al. (2003) and Johnson, Dickinson, and Huitema (2008) hypothesized
that incented performance might be elevated by the addition of performance feedback.
Their rationale was that feedback may become a conditioned reinforcer because of its
link to differential rewards. Both proposed that the addition of feedback to incentive
systems might be one factor accounting for comparable performance levels across
variations in performance-pay systems, and that performance feedback might sustain
performance under a variety of parameters of monetary incentive systems (e.g.,
percentage of total and base pay earned in incentive pay, the schedule of incentive
delivery, and the amount of the per piece incentive). Bucklin et al. and Johnson et al. also
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controlled for two other factors, lack of attractive alternative activities and the social
demands associated with the presence of the experimenter, which may confound the
results of laboratory studies assessing the effects of monetary incentives on performance.
In their study, Bucklin and colleagues (2003) evaluated the effects of individual
monetary incentives with and without feedback and compared the effects of individual
monetary incentives versus hourly pay when both were combined with feedback. For all
participants, performance increased when feedback was added to the incentive condition
and was higher than performance during the feedback plus hourly pay condition. The
results of their study suggest that feedback enhanced incented performance. These results
should be considered with caution, however. When feedback was removed from the
incentive condition, performance for all participants either stabilized or continued to
increase (i.e., did not reverse). The authors suggest that higher levels of performance
were maintained by the additional incentives earned and that this effect overrode any
differential effects of performance feedback.
Different results were obtained by Johnson and colleagues (2008). In their study,
Johnson et al. assessed the effects of objective feedback on the performance of
individuals who received either fixed (hourly) pay or individual monetary incentive pay.
Although the performance of those who received incentive pay increased significantly
more than those who received fixed pay (i.e., participants who received feedback and
incentives correctly completed more checks), the receipt of objective feedback did not
produce statistically significant effects. These results do not support the suggestion that
objective feedback, when correlated with monetary incentives, becomes a conditioned
reinforcer and functions to reinforce performance improvements itself. Rather, Johnson et
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al. propose that objective feedback may, instead, remain a neutral stimulus which does
not enhance performance even when paired with monetary incentives. Johnson and
colleagues affirm that the effects of this type of feedback are likely to differ among
individuals, depending on each person's history of reinforcement and the degree to which
feedback with an evaluative component has been paired with the receipt of valued
rewards.
Two important considerations for the opposing results of the Bucklin et al. (2003)
and Johnson et al. (2008) studies include (a) the types of feedback differed and (b) it is
unknown whether participants actually looked at the feedback. Although the feedback
procedures used in both studies provided objective feedback with regard to performance
of the experimental task, it is possible that Bucklin et al. may have provided some form
of verbal praise or another evaluative statement along with the feedback. Johnson and
colleagues set up their study such that evaluative statements were not paired with the
objective feedback given to their participants.
Even more importantly, the results of these studies may be confounded by
whether participants looked at feedback. Bucklin and colleagues (2003) provided end-ofsession feedback in which the number of points earned by an individual was displayed on
the computer screen at the end of each session. Johnson et al. (2008) provided
continuous, on-screen feedback indicating the total number of checks completed correctly
at that point in the session and the participant's current rate of check completion.
Although both types of feedback were available on the computer screen, there was no
measure of whether participants attended to it. Furthermore, anecdotal support exists
which contends that participants only occasionally view feedback that is constantly
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available during experimental sessions (Hwang & Dickinson, 2007). The contradictory
results found by Bucklin et al. and Johnson et al. warrant future research to examine more
direct measures of the reinforcing value of feedback that enable the detection of when
individuals attend to or come into contact with performance feedback. This, in turn,
permits an assessment of the conditions under which individuals will self-solicit
feedback, which may or may not enhance performance.
Self-Solicited Feedback and Observing Behavior
As mentioned earlier, self-solicited feedback is defined as performance feedback
that can be immediately obtained by an individual performer at any time while they are
performing a task. The response of soliciting feedback appears to be related to what
researchers have traditionally referred to as an observing response. Observing responses
are responses made to obtain stimuli that provide the respondent with information on the
availability of reinforcement or non-reinforcement (Wyckoff, 1952, 1969). An observing
response is usually topographically different from an effective response that is
instrumental in obtaining the reinforcer. Observing responses typically function to
produce a discriminative stimulus (SD) or an S-delta (SA) depending on whether
reinforcement or extinction conditions are in effect (Pierce & Cheney, 2004). In the
literature, this pair of stimuli has also been referred to as consisting of a stimulus
associated with reinforcement or some positive consequence (S+), and a stimulus
associated with non-reinforcement or some negative consequence (S-). Observing
responses do not alter the rate or probability of obtaining reinforcement; that is, the only
function of these responses is to present the stimulus correlated with the current schedule
of reinforcement.
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Two primary hypotheses (i.e., conditioned reinforcement and uncertainty
reduction) regarding the maintenance of observing behavior have been studied
extensively with both non-humans and humans. Results of a recent literature review
(Fante & Slowiak, 2007) revealed that findings from non-human and human research
remain mixed, although the majority of non-human research supports the conditioned
reinforcement hypothesis (e.g., Dinsmoor, Browne, & Lawrence, 1972; Jenkins &
Boakes, 1973; Kelleher & Gollub, 1962; Kendall, 1973; Mulvaney, Dinsmoor, Jwaideh,
& Hughes, 1974). According to the conditioned reinforcement hypothesis, observing
behavior is maintained because of the conditioned reinforcing strength of the stimulus
correlated with the more positive outcome. In contrast, more recent research on human
observing suggests that observing responses are maintained in order to obtain information
resulting in a reduction in uncertainty about the possibility of reinforcement (e.g.,
Lieberman, Cathro, Nichol, & Watson, 1997; Tomanari, 2004).
Researchers have argued that the two hypotheses are similar. The uncertainty
reduction hypothesis may or may not be described in terms of conditioned reinforcement,
and thus it may be considered to be compatible with the conditioned reinforcement
hypothesis. One might argue that a stimulus that becomes a conditioned reinforcer does
so because it reduces uncertainty (Fantino, 1977). However, Jenkins and Boakes (1973),
made the distinction between these hypotheses by stating that both "the negative value as
well as the positive value of the informative stimulus variable reinforces the observing
response" (p. 198). Therefore, regardless of which hypothesis proves true, it appears that
in both cases the stimulus produced by the observing response functions as a conditioned
reinforcer.
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Although no studies were found that examined observing behavior in
organizational settings, an observing response in the form of the self-solicitation of
feedback would appear to be a reasonable way to measure the conditioned reinforcing
effectiveness of feedback. Johnson et al. (2008) stated that feedback might augment the
effects of behavioral consequences because feedback may function as a conditioned
reinforcer due to its history of being delivered concurrently with other reinforcers. Given
that many studies evaluating the use of monetary incentives also included a feedback
component, it is worth determining whether and how often individuals will solicit
performance feedback while receiving monetary incentives and assessing whether selfsoliciting feedback occurs more often when paid incentives than when paid hourly. The
assumption is that feedback would be a stronger conditioned reinforcer because of its link
to monetary incentives or because it reduces the uncertainty of earning additional
incentives.
If self-solicited feedback does indeed function as a conditioned reinforcer, we
would expect the response of soliciting performance feedback to occur more often under
a monetary incentive condition then under an hourly pay condition. This is because pay
received under the monetary incentive condition is directly associated with performance,
whereas pay received under the hourly pay condition is unrelated to performance.
Moreover, soliciting feedback on one's performance during the incentive condition
would allow performers to better estimate the amount of pay they are earning at any
given time during the task. Thus, self-solicited feedback during this condition is paired
with money, a well-known conditioned reinforcer, and reduces the uncertainty of the
amount of incentive pay.
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On the other hand, self-solicited feedback may not function as a conditioned
reinforcer and therefore self-solicitation may not occur more often under the monetary
incentive condition. One possibility for this might be that the response of soliciting
feedback may hinder performance under the incentive condition because the individual
must stop engaging in the task at hand in order to obtain this feedback. As a result of
stopping the task to solicit feedback, it is possible the individual may earn less money
than they would have if they had continued to work without soliciting performance
feedback. Under an hourly pay condition, soliciting feedback has no effect on the amount
of money an individual earns.
It is also the case that self-solicitation of feedback may not occur more often in
the incentive condition when paired with feedback that does not contain an evaluative
component. Based on the results of their study, Johnson et al. (2008) speculated that
"objective" feedback, absent evaluation, is unlikely to increase performance even when
correlated with performance-contingent rewards. Similarly, it may be that such feedback
does not acquire reinforcing value.
Theoretical and Applied Implications
Determining the conditions under which soliciting performance feedback will
occur and the conditions under which this response is more beneficial to the performer
has important theoretical and applied implications. If feedback is solicited at a greater
rate when paired with monetary incentives, this result would lend support for the theory
that feedback functions as a conditioned reinforcer and, hence, may enhance the effects
of monetary incentives. Additionally, if incented performance is not hindered by the
solicitation of performance feedback (i.e., task performance is higher under the monetary
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incentive condition than under the hourly pay condition), this type of feedback system
might be the most beneficial in organizational settings because the response effort for
both management and for the performer is low. Thus, this type of feedback system might
be easier to institutionalize within an organization. On the other hand, it is possible that
this type of feedback system may not be a beneficial component of monetary incentive
systems; instead, it may be found to be more useful when individuals are paid an hourly
rate. Specifically, although obtaining feedback under this condition would have no effect
on pay, the feedback itself may become a conditioned reinforcer and thus increase
performance.
It is important to mention that feedback could function as a conditioned reinforcer
due to its correlation with reinforcers other than monetary incentives, and thus task
performance may be influenced by the effects of pairing performance feedback with
those reinforcers as well. For example, when individuals have a history of reinforcement
in which improved performance has been associated with valued rewards and benefits,
improved performance may itself become a conditioned reinforcer (Skinner, 1953).
Feedback associated with improved performance could then come to function as a
conditioned reinforcer, enhancing performance. Others have discussed this effect using
different terminology, suggesting that feedback can influence a person's performance by
increasing the performer's perceived competence or achievement motivation (Ilgen et al.,
1979; Kopelman, 1986).
Bandura and Cervone's (1983) results appear to support the idea that improved
performance can function as a reinforcer. In their study that examined the motivational
effects of goals, 70% of the participants in the no-goal condition self-set goals to perform
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higher than they had in the past. Similarly, in a recent study conducted by Hwang and
Dickinson (2007), six out of eight participants reported setting goals during a social
comparison feedback phase in which participants were able to compare their own
performance to the performance of others in the study.
If it is true that feedback functions as a conditioned reinforcer due to its link with
other reinforcers (e.g., improved performance and/or performing better than others), then
the solicitation of feedback might be controlled by the extent to which individuals find
these other reinforcers reinforcing as well as by the type of pay system (i.e., hourly pay
vs. incentive pay). It is also possible that other variables, such as improved performance,
might exert stronger control over feedback solicitation than the type of pay system,
depending upon the relative reinforcing value of those variables versus the amount of the
incentive pay.
Role of Personality in Work Motivation
A renewed interest in the role of personality variables in motivation is evident in
the literature (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Heggestad & Kanfer, 2000; Hinsz & Jundt,
2005; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2000; Kanfer & Heggestad, 1997). Research has shown that a
positive relationship exists between the amount of feedback received and task
performance for individuals who have a high need for achievement (Steers, 1975). Ilgen
et al. (1979) contend that feedback provides three types of information to individuals,
including (a) a sense of competence, (b) a sense of personal control over the task, and (c)
the extent to which extrinsic rewards will be obtained. Ilgen and colleagues maintain that
individuals who have a high need for achievement prefer feedback that conveys the first
two types of information, while those whose needs are satisfied externally (i.e., have a
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high need for affiliation) prefer feedback that provides information about extrinsic
rewards.
Research has typically addressed competitiveness as one of several motivational
traits thought to underscore the role of personality in both work and achievement
motivation. Yet, as a personality trait itself, competitiveness has not received as much
attention in the literature as other personality variables, regardless of the fact that it has
been deemed important in many social environments (e.g., sports, academia, work)
(Houston, Farese, & La Du, 1992). One reason for the lack of research on
competitiveness may be the neglect of researchers to develop measures of this trait
which, as Smither & Houston (1992) point out, are (a) independent of measures of
achievement motivation, (b) psychometrically sound, and (c) generalizable.
Competitiveness is generally described in the social sciences literature as the
desire to win in interpersonal situations (e.g., Helmreich & Spence, 1978; Jenkins,
Zyzanski, & Rosenman, 1979; Kildea, 1983; Kohn, 1986), and there is some evidence to
suggest that higher levels of competitiveness are related to higher levels of performance
(Hinsz & Jundt, 2005). Schmitt (1986) proposes four variables which may affect
reinforcement conditions for competitors and which may prove useful in developing a
behavioral interpretation of competition: (a) performance variations, (b) the basis of
reinforcement, (c) reinforcer distribution, and (d) stimuli that indicate the performance of
other competitors (e.g., social-comparison feedback). Furthermore, Schmitt proposes that
the first time individuals engage in a task, they are not affected by current competitive
contingencies. In this case, performance can be described as a function of the individual's
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past history with the task (or similar tasks), along with their past history of competition
and current task-related instructions.
In more traditional terms, Schmitt's (1986) former analysis is related to
"competition with others," while his latter analysis is related to "competition with self."
As discussed earlier, stimuli associated with "performing better than others" or
"performing better than one has performed in the past" could acquire reinforcing value
due to correlation with valued rewards. Schmitt's analysis also suggests that a person
may perform better even when others are not present due to the generalization of past
competitive contingencies when others have been present and performing the same task.
For purposes of the current study, we were particularly interested in the impact
that individual differences in levels of competitiveness might have on feedback
solicitation and task performance. Evaluating competitiveness as a personality variable is
deemed worthwhile, as reports from a previous study indicate that participants sometimes
set goals while performing the same experimental task used in this study in an attempt to
out-perform themselves or others during subsequent sessions (Hwang & Dickinson,
2007). Thus, we would presume, based on these reports and Schmitt's (1986) proposal,
that (a) individuals in the current study would set performance-related goals, (b) the
performance of individuals in the current study and the type of goals they set would be
influenced by their previous experience with competitive conditions, and (c) participants'
levels of competitiveness - assumed to be affected by history with competition - would
be associated with feedback solicitation and task performance.
The Motivational Trait Questionnaire (MTQ; Heggestad & Kanfer, 2000; Kanfer
& Ackerman, 2000) was used to assess traits associated with work motivation, including
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the specific impact of individual differences in competitiveness. The shortened form of
the MTQ is a measure of three motivational traits thought to underscore the role of
personality in both work and achievement motivation (Hinsz & Jundt, 2005). These traits
include (a) personal mastery, (b) competitive excellence, and (c) motivation anxiety
(Kanfer & Ackerman). According to Heggestand and Kanfer, individuals with a high
level of personal mastery are those whom prefer challenging tasks and are often
competitive with themselves; those scoring high in competitive excellence define success
in comparison to how others are performing and seek to out-perform others, even in noncompetitive situations; those scoring high in motivation anxiety have feelings of
avoidance, apprehension, and anxiety that are felt when individuals are performing an
evaluative task.
The MTQ was chosen for this study because it measures both competition with
one's self {mastery goals subscale of the Personal Mastery scale) and competition with
others {other referenced goals and competition seeking subscales of the Competitiveness
Excellence scale). Another reason it was chosen was because Hinsz and Jundt (2005)
found that MTQ scores correlated positively with the performance of an actual task as
well as with participants' personal goals (i.e., the level of goals participants set for
themselves). Similarly, Ward (2005) found that MTQ scores correlated with self-set goal
difficulty when performing a problem-solving task.
Purpose of Current Study
The primary purpose of the current study was to evaluate the frequency of
feedback solicitation under hourly pay and monetary incentive pay conditions. Like
previous studies (e.g., Bucklin et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2008; McGee, Dickinson,

18
Huitema, & Culig, 2007), this study controlled for two potential confounds common in
laboratory studies: (a) lack of attractive alternative activities and (b) social demands due
to the presence of the experimenter. Researchers have hypothesized that these variables
may have been responsible for the failure to produce performance differences under
incentive and feedback conditions (Bucklin et al.; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000;
Mawhinney, 1975).
In this study, computer games served as alternative tasks that performers were
able to access at any time during the experimental sessions. The inclusion of attractive
alternative activities reduced the possibility that individuals would remain continuously
engaged in the experimental task and work at higher-than-typical rates. Although
computer games are only one example of typical off-task activities that exist in the
workplace, they have been used in previous studies on incentives and have been effective
in producing off-task behavior (e.g., Bucklin et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2008; Matthews
& Dickinson, 2000).
Common in most work environments, the presence of a supervisor can have an
effect on worker performance; specifically, workers may engage in on-task activities
more often when their supervisor is present because they have a behavioral history in
which productive behaviors have been reinforced and unproductive behaviors have been
punished. To reduce the potential social demands of the experimenter, the experimenter
was not present during experimental sessions. Similar to a work environment, the
presence of the experimenter may artificially inflate performance of individuals, which
may eliminate performance differences that are predicted to occur under monetary
incentive and hourly pay conditions.
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Furthermore, the present study both controlled for and evaluated the influence of
competitiveness in order to ascertain whether (a) the frequency of feedback solicitation
varied under incentive pay and hourly pay when individual differences in
competitiveness were controlled for and (b) the extent to which competitiveness was
associated with self-solicitation of feedback. Information on participants' levels of
competitiveness (i.e., individual scores from the mastery goals, other referenced goals,
and competition seeking subscales of the MTQ) was collected and used as a covariate
during data analysis.
Task performance was also assessed in the current study to identify (a) overall
differences in performance between participants receiving incentive pay versus those
receiving hourly pay while controlling for keyboard proficiency, and (b) the extent to
which self-solicitation of feedback was related to task performance.
In summary, the current study examined the frequency and conditions under
which individuals solicited feedback on their performance while performing a data entry
task. The primary question we sought to answer was whether individuals would solicit
feedback more when paid monetary incentives than when paid hourly. Additionally, we
wanted to determine whether self-solicitation of feedback would be correlated with an
individual's level of competitiveness. This would enable us to determine whether
competitiveness might have overridden any effects due to the pay system. Finally, this
study evaluated the extent to which self-solicitation of feedback influenced task
performance.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were 60 male and female undergraduate students enrolled in courses
at Western Michigan University, with the exception of those who had taken or were
enrolled in Organizational Psychology (PSY 3440), Industrial/Organizational Behavior
Analysis (PSY 4440), or Survey of Behavior Analysis Research (PSY 4600) at the start
of the study. This exclusionary criterion was included because the effects of monetary
incentives and feedback on work performance are taught in these courses, and knowledge
of these effects could have influenced how participants responded in the current study.
Recruitment consisted of the use of both in-class announcements (see Appendix A for the
recruitment script) and posted flyers within university buildings (see Appendix B for the
recruitment flyer).
Potential participants were screened according to three criteria. First, only
participants who self-reported that they played computer games for at least one hour each
week and reported interest in at least one of seven computer games listed on a screening
questionnaire were included (see Appendix C for the screening questionnaire). Computer
games were provided as alternative off-task activities, similar to that which may be
available in the work place. Therefore, meeting this criterion ensured the computer games
were attractive to students, and that the computer games would serve as appealing offtask activities.
Second, participants were only included if they scored 100% on a quiz that tested
their understanding of the hourly and monetary incentive pay systems used in this study
(see Appendix D for the pay systems quizzes). Participants took the quiz about the pay
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system to which they were exposed; that is, participants assigned to the incentive pay
group took the quiz about the incentive pay system, and participants assigned to the
hourly pay group took the quiz about the hourly pay system. The quiz was administered
to participants after the experimenter explained the respective pay system to the
participant, and participants were allowed to retake the quiz one time, if needed. Meeting
this criterion ensured that participants were able to accurately calculate the amount of pay
they would receive under their respective pay condition.
The final criterion for inclusion in the study was that participants were able to
schedule and attend four 45-minute experimental sessions within a two-week period of
time. This criterion was included to ensure the study was completed in a timely manner
and, more importantly, that participants were exposed to the experimental conditions
within a short period of time, increasing the saliency of the independent variable.
Participants were paid for their participation in this study; payment procedures are
described in more detail in the Independent Variable and Experimental Procedures
sections. Prior to being screened for inclusion in the study, participants were asked to
sign a consent form approved by Western Michigan University's Human Subjects
Institutional Review (HSIRB; see Appendix E). Only participants who signed the
informed consent form were screened and considered for inclusion in the study.
All methodological procedures and other elements of this study were approved by
Western Michigan University's HSIRB (see Appendix F for the HSIRB approval letter).
All potential participants met the aforementioned criteria and completed the
study; that is, no participants withdrew before completion.
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Setting
The experimental setting consisted of one of three small rooms and the
Performance Management Laboratory (PM Lab). The three rooms were located in 2510,
2512, and 2514 Wood Hall, and the PM Lab was located in 2532 Wood Hall. In the small
rooms, each participant was provided with a work area containing a table, adjustable
chair, computer, keyboard, mouse, and gel palm rest. The PM Lab across the hall was
used as a "waiting area" for participants prior to beginning their experimental sessions, as
well as to confirm subsequently scheduled sessions following their sessions.
Materials, Experimental Task, and Alternative Activities
Motivational Trait Questionnaire (MTQ). The MTQ is a 48-item questionnaire
that assessed three motivational traits, each with two subscales: (1) personal mastery:
desire-to-learn and mastery goals subscales, (2) competitive excellence: other referenced
goals and competition seeking subscales, and (3) motivation anxiety: worry and
emotionality scales. Responses to each item are made using a 6-point response scale
ranging from 1 {very untrue of me) to 6 {very true of me). Some examples of items on the
MTQ include: "I set goals as a way to improve my performance" and "It is important for
me to outperform my co-workers." Participant instructions and a larger sample of
questionnaire items can be found in Appendix G (a full copy cannot be included because
the instrument is protected by copyright). Individual scores for each of the subscales are
calculated by adding up the points of each of the responses to the items for the respective
subscales.
Experimental task The experimental task was a data entry task that simulated the
job of a bank proof operator. An image of a simulated bank check was displayed on the
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computer screen with a randomly generated dollar amount, ranging in value from $10.00
to $999.99 (see Appendix H for a screen shot of the check program). Using the
computer's numeric keypad, participants entered the dollar amount of the check into a
box in the lower, right corner of the computer screen. To complete the action, the
participant pressed the "Enter" key, and the next check was displayed on the screen.
Participants could also use the computer mouse to click on the "Next Check" button to
advance to the next check.
At any time during the experimental session, participants were able to obtain
information about their current level of performance by either (a) holding down the
"Alt+F" keys on the keyboard or (b) clicking on the "Feedback" button using the mouse.
The "Feedback" button was located above the graphic display of the bank check (within
the Program Controls menu). When this button was clicked, a dialogue box was
presented on the computer screen and contained (1) the current number of checks
completed during the session, (2) the current number of checks completed correctly
during the session, and (3) the current rate of check completion (i.e., average number of
checks completed per minute), which was updated every 30 seconds. The feedback
dialogue box remained on the screen until the "OK" button was clicked on the dialogue
box or until the "Enter" key was pressed on the keyboard. Participants were not able to
continue to enter data while the feedback dialogue box was displayed on the screen.
Alternative activities. Seven computer games were available on each computer,
and participants had access to these games at all times during the experimental sessions.
These games included Tetris, Hearts, Pinball, Solitaire, Spider Solitaire, FreeCell, and
Minesweeper. Instructions on how to play these games were available in each

experimental room near the computer. To access the games, participants had to minimize
the experimental task program, which could be done by using the computer mouse to
click on the "Minimize Program" button.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable was the total number of times the "Feedback"
button was clicked to obtain performance feedback. This variable was termed selfsolicitedfeedback and is reported as the total number of times the participant clicked on
the "Feedback" button during each experimental session. The times during the
experimental session that participants self-solicited feedback were also collected and are
reported as the frequency of feedback solicitation during 5-min intervals of time
throughout the experimental session.
Secondary dependent variables included (a) the total number of checks correctly
completed per session (i.e., task performance), (b) the percentage correct per session, (c)
the time spent performing the experimental task, and (d) the rate of correct check
completion. Of these secondary measures, the first (task performance) could potentially
be affected by the other three secondary variables: accuracy while working on the task,
the amount of time spent on the task, and the pace of performance while on task.
Therefore, it was valuable to include all as secondary dependent variables.
The computer automatically recorded (a) the number of times the "Feedback"
button was clicked per session, (b) the points in time during the experimental session that
participants self-solicited feedback, (c) the total number of checks completed per session,
(d) the number of checks completed correctly per session, and (e) the number of seconds
the participant was not engaged in the experimental task (i.e., time spent off-task). The
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percentage of checks correctly completed per session was calculated by dividing the
number of checks correctly completed by the total number of checks completed and
multiplying by 100. Time spent off-task was recorded by the computer program when the
participant was not performing the experimental task for 10 seconds. When the
participant resumed work on the check program, the computer stopped recording "offtask" activity. Time spent on-task was calculated by subtracting the total time spent offtask from the session length. Rate of correct check completion was calculated by dividing
the number of checks completed correctly by the time (in minutes) spent on-task.
Following each experimental session, the researcher saved all session data
electronically onto a disk that was unique for each participant. Data were also recorded
manually onto a data sheet (see Appendix I); both of these steps were taken to minimize
the chance that data would be lost due to a computer malfunction.
Independent Variable
The independent variable was the type of pay system (hourly pay vs. individual
monetary incentive pay).
Hourly pay. In the hourly pay condition, participants were paid $5.75 for each 45minute session regardless of their performance on the experimental task. An instructional
script was read to participants before they began their first session (see Appendix J).
Individual monetary incentive pay. In the incentive pay condition, participants
earned incentives based on their performance during the experimental session. For every
correctly processed check, participants earned $0,007. Thus, to earn the amount
equivalent to those in the hourly pay condition, participants needed to correctly process
821 checks (i.e., 821 x $0,007 = $5.75). These figures were based on the average
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performance of participants who were paid individual incentives in the Johnson et al.
(2008) study. If participants in the incentive condition processed more than 821 checks
correctly, they earned more money than those in the hourly pay condition due to the
incentive pay. The instructional script that was read to participants before they began
their first session is provided in Appendix K.
Experimental Design and Statistical Analysis
A randomized group design was used, and participants were randomly assigned to
one of the two groups. The hourly pay and monetary incentive pay conditions each
contained 30 participants.
Primary analyses. A one-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
evaluate whether the average number of times participants solicited feedback (i.e.,
clicked the "Feedback" button) differed across the two experimental groups. A
descriptive analysis was carried out to examine the average frequency of feedback
solicitation during 5-min intervals across experimental sessions for both pay groups.
Following the initial analyses, correlational analyses using the Pearson product
moment correlation were carried out to determine whether and what degree of association
existed between feedback solicitation and individual levels of competitiveness, as
assessed by three subscales of the MTQ: mastery goals, other referenced goals, and
competition seeking. One-factor analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) were then used to
evaluate whether the average number of times participants solicited feedback differed
across the two experimental groups using individual participant scores from the MTQ
subscales as the covariates. These covariates partially controlled for individual
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differences among the participants' response of soliciting feedback with respect to levels
of competitiveness.
Secondary analyses. Additional analyses were conducted to evaluate the effects of
the type of pay system and self-solicitation of feedback on task performance. An
ANCOVA was used to determine whether the average number of checks completed
correctly differed among participants in the hourly pay and incentive pay conditions
while controlling for keyboard proficiency. The covariate for this analysis was the rate of
correct check completion per minute during the pre-test session.
Next, a correlational analysis was performed to assess the extent to which selfsolicitation of feedback was related to task performance. Additional analyses evaluated
the association between the average number of checks completed correctly per session
and (a) the average time (in minutes) spent on-task per session, (b) the average
percentage of checks completed correctly per session, and (c) the rate of correct check
completion per minute per session.
Experimental Procedures
Random assignment. Participants were randomly assigned to either the hourly pay
or incentive pay condition and assigned a participant number prior to the introductory
sessions. These procedures were necessary because two different consent forms were
used, one specific to each of the two pay conditions, in order to prevent participants from
knowing that the two different conditions existed. The random assignment procedure
described by Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (p. 313, 2002) was used.
Payment. All participants were paid in cash at the end of the study. This
procedure was necessary to control for any potential confounding effects of payment as
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another source of feedback, in addition to self-solicited feedback, related to the
performance of the experimental task. This was relevant for individuals in the monetary
incentive pay condition as their pay was directly tied to their performance.
Introductory session. During the introductory session, the researcher explained
the following aspects of the study to all potential participants: (a) the experimental task,
(b) the appropriate pay system and procedures, and (c) the time requirements for
participation. Following this explanation, signed consent was sought. Potential
participants for whom consent was obtained underwent the screening process to
determine whether they met all the criteria described in the Participants section.
Participants were asked to complete the MTQ to obtain measures of individual
competitiveness. After completing the MTQ, participants were asked schedule their pretest (described in the next section) and experimental sessions. Finally, participants were
taken into one of the experimental rooms and given the opportunity to try the
experimental task and the available computer games. Participants were paid $5.75 for
their attendance at the introductory session; however, this amount was paid to
participants at the end of the study.
Pre-test session. A 45-minute pre-test session was required of all participants, and
participants were paid $5.75 for attending this session. The rate of correct check
completion per minute during this session was used as covariate data to control for
differences in initial keyboard proficiency.
Before beginning the pre-test session, the researcher met with participants in the
PM Lab (Wood Hall 2532) and gave the following instructions to participants: "People
have very different keyboard skills. During this first session, we want to determine your

skill level. Therefore it is very important that you work as hard as you can. You will earn
$5.75, and we will pay you for this session at the end of the study. Please leave your
personal belongings in this room, including cell phones, pagers, MP3 players, iPods, and
any other similar electronic devices. If you need anything, just come get me - 1 will be in
this room. I will come and stop the session after 45 minutes. Again, please try to
complete as many checks as you can. Do you have any questions?"
Experimental sessions. Three 45-minute experimental sessions over a two-week
period were scheduled for each participant. Participants met the researcher in the PM Lab
prior to each session before they were taken into the experimental room. Instructions
about the experimental task were given to participants before their first session (see
Appendices J and K for instructional scripts). At the end of the 45-minute session, the
researcher knocked on the door and entered the experimental room to signal the end of
the session. The researcher thanked the participant for his or her time and asked the
participant to return to the PM Lab to confirm his or her next scheduled experimental
session.
Debriefing session. Immediately after their last experimental session, participants
attended a debriefing session. This session was held in the PM Lab (2532 Wood Hall),
and participants were given feedback on (a) how many checks they completed correctly
each session, (b) how many total checks they completed correctly during the study, and
(c) how many times they solicited feedback on their performance during each session
(see Appendix L for feedback forms). Participants were also asked to complete a short
post-study questionnaire (Appendix M) to obtain information such as (a) participants'
perception of the purpose of the study, (b) participants' awareness of the experimental

procedures, (c) participants' satisfaction with the option to solicit performance feedback,
and (d) participants' self-reported goal setting behavior. After completing the
questionnaire, participants were debriefed regarding the purpose of the study (see
Appendix N for debriefing script), asked whether they had any questions, and paid (in
cash) for their participation in the study.
Independent Variable Integrity
Procedures were in place to ensure (a) the data were recorded accurately, (b) pay
amounts were calculated appropriately, (c) pay systems were administered correctly, and
(d) experimental procedures were administered as described previously. At the beginning
of each week, the researcher tested the computer program to verify the accuracy of data
collection procedures. In addition, a pay chart (see Appendix O) was used to ensure
participants in the incentive pay condition received the appropriate amount of pay per
session, reducing the need to manually compute payment amounts. Payment amounts for
participants in the incentive pay condition were determined by comparing the number of
correctly processed checks recorded by the computer program to the pay chart. All
payment amounts were verified by the experimenter by calculating inter-observer
agreement (dividing the number of agreements by the number of agreements plus
disagreements and multiplying by 100). Inter-observer agreement was 100%. Scripts (see
Appendices J and K) were used and read to participants at the start of each experimental
session to ensure the pay systems for each condition were administered correctly. Finally,
job aids (i.e., checklists) were employed during the pre-test and experimental sessions to
ensure procedures were implemented properly.
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RESULTS
Primary Analyses
The main purpose of the study was to determine whether participants would selfsolicit feedback more when they were paid individual incentives than when they were
paid hourly. The average frequency of feedback solicitation during experimental sessions
was 6.89 (SD = 5.44) for the hourly group and 5.33 (SD = 4.76) for the incentive group.
Table 1 shows the source table for the results of the ANOVA. The obtained
difference in frequency of feedback solicitation between the incentive pay and hourly pay
groups of 1.56 was not statistically significant, F(\, 58) = 1.39,p = 0.243. Thus,
participants did not self-solicit feedback more when they were paid individual monetary
incentives.
Table 1
Analysis of Variance for Feedback Solicitation
Source

df

SS

MS

F

P

Pay System

1

36.30

36.30

1.39

0.243

Error

58

1514.70

26.10

Total

59

1551.00

Figure 1 displays the average frequency of feedback solicitation for each pay
group during 5-min intervals across all three experimental sessions. This figure shows an
increasing trend across time for participants in the incentive group; specifically, feedback
solicitation increased as time to the end of the session approached. Frequency of feedback
solicitation was variable across session intervals (i.e., no apparent trends) for participants
in the hourly group.
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5-Minute Interval

Figure 1. Averagefrequencyof feedback solicitation for each pay group during 5-min
intervals.
To determine whether competitiveness was related to self-solicitation of feedback,
Pearson product-moment correlations were conducted between feedback solicitation and
individual levels of competitiveness as assessed by three subscales of the MTQ: mastery
goals, other referenced goals, and competition seeking. Table 2 displays these
correlations; none were statistically significant.
Table 2
Pearson Correlations Between Feedback Solicitation and MTQ Subscales
Frequency of Feedback
Solicitation Correlated with:

r

P

Mastery Goals

-0.24

0.07

Other Referenced Goals

0.03

0.80

Competition Seeking

-0.02

0.91
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To evaluate whether the frequency of feedback solicitation varied under incentive
pay and hourly pay when individual differences in competitiveness were controlled for,
ANCOVAs were conducted. Individual scores from the mastery goals, other referenced
goals, and competition seeking subscales of the MTQ were covariates.
The adjusted means for the feedback solicitation data, using mastery goals as a
covariate, were 6.85 for the hourly group and 5.37 for the incentive group. Table 3 shows
the source table for the results of the ANCOVA. The obtained difference in frequency of
feedback solicitation of 1.48 was not statistically significant, F(l, 57) = 1.30, p = 0.259.
Table 3
Analysis of Covariance for Feedback Solicitation (Covariate: Mastery Goals)
Source

df

SS

MS

F

P

Covariate

1

82.52

82.52

3.28

0.075

Pay System

1

32.65

32.65

1.30

0.259

Error

57

1432.22

25.13

Total

59

1551.04

The adjusted means for the feedback solicitation data, using other referenced
goals as a covariate, were 6.95 for the hourly group and 5.27 for the incentive group.
Table 4 shows the source table for the results of the ANCOVA. The obtained difference
in frequency of feedback solicitation of 1.68 was not statistically significant, F(l, 57) =
1.55,;? = 0.219.

Table 4
Analysis of Covariance for Feedback Solicitation (Covariate: Other Referenced Goals)
Source

df

SS

MS

F

P

Covariate

1

6.37

6.37

0.24

0.626

Pay System

1

40.95

40.95

1.55

0.219

Error

57

1508.37

26.46

Total

59

1551.04

The adjusted means for the feedback solicitation data, using competition seeking
as a covariate, were 6.90 for the hourly group and 5.33 for the incentive group. Table 5
shows the source table for the results of the ANCOVA. The obtained difference in
frequency of feedback solicitation of 1.57 was not statistically significant, F(\, 57) =
1.36,/? = 0.249.
Table 5
Analysis of Covariance for Feedback Solicitation (Covariate: Competition Seeking)
Source

df

SS

MS

F

P

Covariate

1

0.14

0.14

0.01

0.943

Pay System

1

36.08

36.08

1.36

0.249

Error

57

1514.60

26.57

Total

59

1551.04

The three preceding analyses indicate that frequency of feedback solicitation did
not vary under incentive pay and hourly pay when individual differences in levels of
competition with one's self (mastery goals) and competition with others (other
referenced goals and competition seeking) were controlled for.
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Secondary Analyses
To determine whether the average number of correctly completed checks differed
for the two pay groups, an ANCOVA was conducted using keyboard proficiency as the
covariate. The rate of correct check completion per minute during the pre-test session was
used as the measure of keyboard proficiency.
The average number of correctly completed checks during experimental sessions
was 632.4 (SD = 258.1) for the hourly group and 885.7 (SD = 200.0) for the incentive
group. The adjusted means for task performance, using keyboard proficiency as a
covariate, were 635.94 for the hourly group and 882.14 for the incentive group. Table 6
shows the source table for the results of the ANCOVA. The obtained difference of 246.2
checks for the pay system variable was statistically significant, F(l, 57) = 32.10, p 0.000. Thus, participants completed more checks correctly when they were paid
individual monetary incentives.
Table 6
Analysis of Covariance for Number of Correctly Completed Checks
Source

df

MS

F

P

Covariate

1

1477537

1477537

52.20

0.000

Pay System

1

908798

908798

32.10

0.000

Error

57

1613514

28307

Total

59

4052958

SS

To determine whether there was a relationship between feedback solicitation and
task performance (i.e., whether participants who self-solicited feedback also performed
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better), a Pearson product-moment correlation was conducted. The relationship between
these variables was not statistically significant, r = -0.100, p = 0.447.
The number of correctly completed checks (task performance) could have been
affected by three variables: (a) percentage of checks completed correctly, (b) the rate of
correct check completion, and (c) time on-task. Table 7 displays the means and standard
deviations for these variables for both pay groups.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Percentage of Correctly Completed Checks,
Rate of Correct Check Completion, and Time On-Task
Dependent Variable
Percentage of Correctly
Completed Checks

Rate of Correct
Check Completion

Time On-Task

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Hourly

98.29

1.20

19.47

3.69

31.99

10.28

Incentive

98.24

1.23

20.62

3.79

42.82

4.54

Pay System

Table 8 displays the Pearson product-moment correlations between the number of
correctly completed checks and these variables. Two of the three correlations were
statistically significant at the .001 level. The relationship between the number of correctly
completed checks and the percentage of correctly completed checks was nonsignificant.
Strong relationships were seen between the number of correctly completed checks and
both the number of checks completed per minute and the time spent on task. These results
suggest that the number of correctly completely checks was influenced by both of these
factors.
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Table 8
Pearson Correlations Between Number of Correctly Completed Checks and Percentage of
Correctly Completed Checks, Rate of Correct Check Completion, and Time On-Task
Number of Correctly Completed Checks
Correlated with:

r

P

Percentage of Correctly Completed Checks

0.107

0.416

Rate of Correct Check Completion

0.732

0.000

Time On-Task

0.835

0.000

Self-Report Data
Ninety-two percent (N = 55) of participants engaged in feedback solicitation
during the experimental sessions. Table 9 displays the frequency and percentage of
participant responses obtained from items on the post-study questionnaire with regard to
self-solicited feedback.
Table 9
Participant Comments: Self-Solicited Feedback
Response
Yes

No

N/Aor
No Response

Liked option to solicit feedback

51 (85%)

3 (5%)

6(10%)

Would prefer another type of feedback

14 (23%)

45 (75%)

1 (2%)

Felt feedback improved performance

45 (75%)

10 (17%)

5 (8%)

Felt feedback caused goal-setting

43(72%)

4(7%)

13(22%)

Item

38
Eighty percent (N = 48) of participants self-reported that they set performancerelated goals. Table 10 displays a summary of participant responses obtained from items
on the post-study questionnaire with regard to the types of performance goals set.
Table 10
Participant Comments: Performance Goals
Type of Goal

N

Percent

Overall quantity

30

63%

Increased quantity based on previous session

7

15%

Accuracy

6

13%

Rate

2

4%

Remain on task for a pre-determined amount of time

2

4%

Not Specified

1

2%
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DISCUSSION
The results of the present study suggest three main conclusions regarding
feedback solicitation. First, participants who were paid individual monetary incentives
did not self-solicit feedback more often than those who were paid an hourly wage.
Second, the frequency of feedback solicitation did increase as time to the end of the
session approached for individuals paid monetary incentives; a clear trend in feedback
solicitation across time was not observed for those paid hourly. Third, feedback
solicitation was not related to differences in individual levels of competition with one's
self or competition with others. Given that findings regarding the relationship between
competition and performance contradicted previous results (Hinsz & Jundt, 2005; Ward,
2005) and were primarily of exploratory interest, the following discussion will focus only
on the frequency of feedback solicitation and task performance under the two pay
conditions.
Regarding task performance, two main conclusions can be made from the results
of this study. First, task performance differed significantly between the two pay groups.
Specifically, participants completed more checks correctly when they were paid
individual monetary incentives. Second, task performance was not associated with
feedback solicitation. That is, individuals who self-solicited performance feedback did
not complete significantly more correct checks than those who did not solicit feedback.
The above results, together with the primary analysis that indicated that the
frequency of feedback solicitation was comparable when individuals were paid monetary
incentives and hourly wages, imply that monetary incentives did not increase the
reinforcing value of self-solicited feedback in comparison to hourly pay. That is, the fact
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that the frequency of feedback solicitation did not differ when individuals were paid
monetary incentives or hourly pay suggests that this type of feedback did not become
more valuable due to its link with the amount of pay individuals earned. This was true
even though participants performed significantly better when paid incentives, indicating
that the individual monetary incentives were functional rewards. The relatively high rates
of feedback solicitation across both pay groups do, however, imply that performance
feedback is valuable to performers regardless of whether it informs them how much
money they will earn.
As noted earlier, self-solicitation of feedback was not related to improved task
performance. This result contradicts those of two previous studies that examined the
effects of self-generated and computer-mediated feedback on performance. Both found a
positive association between those types of feedback and performance (Earley, 1988;
Northcraft & Earley, 1989). Methodological differences may account for the
contradictory results in the present study. Differences relate to (a) the
availability/frequency of feedback, (b) the response effort associated with obtaining
feedback, and (c) the association of feedback with performance goals.
In this study, performance feedback was continuously available to participants via
an EPM system and could be displayed with the simple click of a computer mouse. That
is, at any time during the experimental sessions participants could solicit feedback from
the computer program by clicking on the "Feedback" button. Additionally, feedback was
not associated with assigned performance goals in the present study. In the
aforementioned studies by Earley (1988) and Northcraft and Earley (1989), (a) computermediated feedback was available only once at the end of each work day or at the
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beginning of each session, (b) individuals self-generated performance feedback using
performance data collected by a computer, and (c) feedback was associated with
performance goals (e.g., process a particular number of magazine subscriptions, increase
the value of a stock portfolio).
The inclusion of performance goals would appear to be the factor mostly likely to
contribute to the differential results found between the present study and those mentioned
above. Assigned performance goals were absent in this study; however, results of the
self-report data collected from participant questionnaires revealed that 80% (N = 48) of
participants engaged in self-generated goal setting. The distinction between assigned and
self-generated goals is important with regard to the interpretation of the results of the
present study. Assigned performance goals imply some element of evaluation from an
outside source (i.e., assigned goals contain an evaluative component). In addition,
assigned goals imply, based on the behavioral histories of most individuals, that behavior
that leads to goal attainment will be followed by a positive consequence (e.g.,
praise/reward), and behavior that fails to result in goal attainment will be followed by a
negative consequence (e.g., criticism). In contrast, self-generated goals do not have any
implication for how well a person is performing. For example, an individual could self
generate a goal that is much lower than normative or average performance. Thus,
although most participants in this study generated goals for themselves, those goals
would not be considered assigned goals and would not imply evaluation.
The function of self-generated goal setting, as it relates to the results of the
current study, is unknown. The self-generated goals could have influenced performance
and may account for the undifferentiated performance between the two pay groups.
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Therefore, given that the majority of participants engaged in self-generated goal setting,
the extent to which self-solicitation of feedback is related to self-generated goal setting
should be examined. Furthermore, studies should investigate whether self-solicitation of
feedback engenders more goal setting than feedback provided by other sources, such as a
supervisor. Self-solicitation of feedback may increase the frequency of self-generated
goal setting because individuals have the option to solicit performance feedback more
often and more immediately from a computer source than may be possible from a
supervisor or alternative source.
A few studies have suggested that feedback may need to have an evaluative
component (e.g., praise/criticism) in order to affect performance (Brown, Willis, Reid,
1981; Crowell, Anderson, Abel, & Sergio, 1988). However, the computer-generated
feedback received by individuals in the Earley (1988) and Northcraft and Early (1989)
studies was purposely not paired with praise, criticism, or other evaluative statements.
Earley suggests the perceived evaluative component associated supervisor-provided
feedback may decrease performance for individuals who are concerned about external
evaluation; thus, because a computer is not (typically) an evaluative source, performance
of individuals sensitive to evaluation may be higher when they receive feedback from a
non-evaluative source. From a behavioral viewpoint, Earley's explanation suggests that
individuals who have been criticized or punished for not performing well (as is often the
case in a typical business setting) would be more likely to prefer computer-generated
feedback. In addition, Northcraft and Earley found that self-generated feedback (with and
without the use of a computer) was perceived as more trustworthy and useful than
feedback provided by a supervisor or by the organization.
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The results of the present study are similar to those found by Johnson et al.
(2008), providing additional evidence that objective feedback does not enhance
performance, regardless of whether the feedback is paired with hourly pay or individual
monetary incentive pay. Feedback was not associated with assigned goals in either study,
suggesting again that an evaluative component may be necessary to enhance
performance. Although praise and/or criticism are common evaluative components,
assigned goals in combination with specific performance feedback in relation to those
goals may be another example of an evaluative component that enables self-evaluation of
performance. This contention is supported by Earley's (1988) finding that individuals
who received specific feedback achieved higher levels of performance; individuals were
able to use the specific feedback in order to adjust their performance. Results of the
present study, along with those of Earley, support the proposal by Johnson et al. that
feedback may not be effective unless some type of evaluation is implied or explicitly
provided along with it.
Research has not examined the effects of evaluative feedback delivered by a
computer. As mentioned earlier, the form of self-solicited feedback available to
participants via the computer program in the current study was objective feedback and
did not contain any type of evaluation. Future research should examine self-solicited
feedback (available from a computer) when combined with some type of evaluative
component that informs performers how well they are doing in comparison to an
objective standard or in comparison to others. Again, this lack of an evaluative
component (i.e., assigned goals which imply evaluation) may account for why the results
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of this study differed from the results of previous studies (Earley, 1988; Northcraft &
Earley, 1989).
Although the frequency of feedback solicitation was not significantly different
between the two pay groups, a difference in the patterns of self-solicitation across time
was observed. As mentioned earlier, feedback solicitation increased as time to the end of
the session approached for individuals paid monetary incentives; the frequency of
feedback solicitation was variable across session intervals for participants paid hourly.
From a behavioral perspective, one possible explanation for this difference is that the
reinforcing effectiveness of self-solicited feedback might have changed over time for
individuals paid incentives. Since the number of correctly completed checks was directly
related to the amount of money earned, the effect of solicited feedback (indicating high or
low numbers) could have varied depending on the amount of time left in the session. For
example, self-solicited feedback may have been a weak reinforcer (or possibly even a
punisher) at the start of the experimental sessions because the feedback would have
indicated low levels of performance associated with a small amount of money earned.
However, toward the end of the session (e.g., during the last 15 minutes), the solicited
feedback was more likely to indicate a higher number of correctly completed checks.
Thus, in this case, the feedback was associated with a larger amount of money earned and
may have been a stronger conditioned reinforcer, yet still not sufficiently strong to
influence the number of correctly completed checks.
There are some limitations to generality of the results obtained in this study. The
most obvious is the fact that this was a laboratory simulation versus an applied study;
thus, generality to actual work settings is limited. Additionally, although the use of EPM
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systems is becoming a common method for delivering performance feedback (Mallo et
al., 2007), providing computer-delivered feedback is not currently representative of how
feedback is typically provided in the work place. Typically, feedback is delivered by
another individual (e.g., supervisor) and is paired with some degree of evaluation.
Moreover, delivering feedback via an EPM system would not be possible for all job
tasks, since many do not permit measurement by a computer-tracking mechanism.
Another limitation concerns the fact that participants in the monetary incentive
condition were unable to engage in the experimental task while looking at performance
feedback. It is possible that this procedural deficit both suppressed and punished
feedback solicitation for some participants. In fact, four of the participants who did not
engage in feedback solicitation reported that the reason they didn't was because they did
not want to "waste time" or "lose money." Overall, larger frequencies of feedback
solicitation might also have been seen for this group if feedback solicitation was not
associated with loss of time to earn incentive pay. Future studies should attempt to extend
the length of the session for participants working for monetary incentives according to
the amount of time participants looked at feedback.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, this study is important because of its
foundational nature; that is, the present study was the first to attempt to identify variables
which may influence feedback solicitation beyond feedback source (e.g., Kluger & Adler,
1989). As mentioned in the introduction, identifying conditions under which feedback
solicitation occurs would allow researchers to identify the function of this form of
feedback (theoretical advantage), as well as allow organizations to set up effective EPM
feedback systems (applied advantage).
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In addition, the current study provided a direct measure which enabled the
detection of when individuals attended to or came in contact with performance feedback.
Previous studies (e.g., Bucklin et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2008) did not assess whether
individuals actually saw the feedback which was provided to them. Whereas individuals
in the present study had to make an active response in order to view performance
feedback, individuals in the Johnson et al. and Bucklin et al. studies were simply given
the opportunity to view feedback that was provided to them on the computer screen (i.e.,
a passive response). The detection procedure used in the present study will allow for
future assessments of additional conditions under which individuals might self-solicit
feedback, which may or may not enhance performance.
As indicated in the Results section, strong relationships were found between task
performance (i.e., number of correctly completed checks) and both the rate of correctly
completed checks (speed of performance) and the time spent on-task. Specifically,
individuals who worked at higher rates and spent more time engaged in the experimental
task performed better. In addition, while the percentage of correctly completed checks
(i.e., accuracy) was not significantly correlated with the number of correctly completed
checks, accuracy was not negatively affected by better performance. However, it should
be noted that the receipt of monetary incentives was contingent upon quality (i.e.,
correctly completed checks). The preceding results are almost identical to those of other
incentive studies using the same experimental task (Johnson, 2005; McGee et al., 2007).
Thus, these results lend additional support for the contention that individual monetary
incentives improve performance with the type of rate-oriented task used in these studies
because performers spend more time working and/or work faster.
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Given the current results and associated implications, several possibilities for
future research exist. The most obvious extension of the present study would examine
frequency of feedback solicitation, with and without an evaluative component, under
hourly pay and individual monetary pay conditions. Then, if a difference was found (i.e.,
evaluative component makes feedback more valuable), it would be appropriate to assess
effects on performance and whether frequency of feedback solicitation differs under
hourly versus incentive pay conditions when evaluative feedback is delivered by a
supervisor/experimenter or self-solicited from a computer.
The initial study would allow for the examination of whether the availability of an
evaluative component influences frequency of feedback solicitation. The second study
would focus on the effects of different sources of evaluative feedback on performance.
An additional phase could be added to the second study to set up a choice component;
once individuals have been exposed to both sources of evaluative feedback, they could be
given the choice to work under either condition (i.e., self-solicited evaluative feedback or
supervisor-delivered evaluative feedback).
As indicated earlier, this study was one of the first attempts to utilize procedures
to enable detection of whether individuals came into contact with feedback provided by a
computer by requiring participants to make a response to obtain that feedback. In
addition, this study was the first to examine conditions under which feedback solicitation
will occur and conditions that may increase the frequency of feedback solicitation.
Although the current results demonstrated no difference in the frequency of self-solicited
feedback between individuals paid hourly versus those paid incentives, these results do
provide support for the contention that feedback may not be effective unless paired with

an evaluative component, such as praise, criticism, or assigned goals. Thus, this study
provides a foundation for future research to examine other factors that may influence
self-solicited feedback, as well as factors that may enhance the effectiveness of this type
of feedback.
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Recruitment Script (In-Class Announcement)
Hello. My name is Julie Slowiak, and I am a doctoral student in psychology at Western
Michigan University. I am looking for individuals to participate in a study designed to
evaluate how well individuals perform a data entry task under different conditions. The
data entry task simulates the job of a bank proof operator and consists of entering
numbers using the numeric keypad on a computer. Computer games will also be available
during the sessions if individuals want to play them. The study will be conducted in
Wood Hall on WMU's campus.
If you are currently enrolled in or have completed PSY 3440, Organizational Psychology
PSY 4440, Industrial/Organizational Behavior Analysis or PSY 4600, Survey of
Behavior Analysis Research, you are not eligible to participate because what you learned
in those classes could influence your performance. In addition, you must play computer
games at least one hour per week to be eligible to participate.
Sessions will be 45 minutes and you will be asked to attend 5 sessions over a 2-week
period. The amount of money you will earn will depend upon the conditions in the study,
but it is likely that you will earn from $4.00 to $8.00 per session.
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time. If you do
withdraw, you will be paid the money you have earned up to that point. Your willingness
to participate in the study or your withdrawal from the study at a later time will not affect
your grade in this or any other class.
If you would like to learn more about this study, please print your name, phone number
or email address, whichever is most convenient for you, on a sheet of paper and give it to
me. I am also handing out a sheet of paper with my name and email address, and you can
contact me by email if you prefer.
I will contact you within the next few days to arrange a time when we can meet to discuss
the details of the study.
Thank you!
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Appendix B
Recruitment Flyer
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RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS NEEDED
I am looking for individuals to participate in a study designed to evaluate how well
individuals perform a data entry task under different conditions. The data entry task
simulates the job of a bank proof operator and consists of entering numbers using the
numeric keypad on a computer.
Participants will be paid for their participation in this study. While the amount of pay will
vary, participants are likely to receive $4.00 - $8.00 per session. To be eligible to
participate, you must play computer games at least one hour a week. You are not eligible
to participate if you have taken or are currently enrolled in PSY 3440 (Organizational
Psychology), PSY 4440 (Industrial/Organizational Behavior Analysis), or PSY 4600
(Survey of Behavior Analysis Research).
Sessions will be conducted in Wood Hall. The study will last two weeks (four sessions
total). In addition, potential participants will need to attend an introductory session prior
to the beginning of the study.
If you are interested in learning more about this study, please contact Julie Slowiak. Be
sure to provide your name, e-mail address or telephone number, and the times you can be
reached
All information is confidential.
Thank you!
For more information contact Julie Slowiak:
E-mail: julie.slowiak@wmich.edu
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Appendix C
Screening Questionnaire

Screening Questionnaire
Participant Number:
Please complete the following questions. All information you provide will remain
confidential.
1. Have you taken, or are currently taking, either of the following classes?
PS Y 3440, Organizational Psychology

Yes

No

PSY 4440, Industrial/Organizational Behavior Analysis

Yes

No

PS Y 4600, Survey of Behavior Analysis Research

Yes

No

2. Do you play any of the following computer games?
FreeCell

Yes

No

Hearts

Yes

No

Minesweeper

Yes

No

Pinball

Yes

No

Solitaire

Yes

No

Spider Solitaire

Yes

No

Tetris

Yes

No

3. If you play any of the games listed above, how often do you play?
1

2

3

4

5

6
5

7

8

1 2

3

4

6

1 2

3

4 times a month

9

times a day

7 days a week

4. On average, how many hours a week do you play computer games?
Less than 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

10+hours

5. Do you know anyone that has signed up to participate in the study? If so, please list
their names.
Thank you!
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Appendix D
Pay System Quizzes

Pay System Quiz
Participant Number:

PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $.007 for every check correctly processed during the session.

Answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Dan correctly processed 1150 checks during a session. How much money did Dan
earn for that session?

2. Mary correctly processed 220 checks during a session. How much money did Mary
earn for that session?

3. Billy correctly processed 730 checks during a session. How much money did Billy
earn for that session?
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Pay System Quiz
Participant Number:

PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $5.75 per session.

Answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Dan correctly processed 1150 checks during a session. How much money did Dan
earn for that session?

2. Mary correctly processed 220 checks during a session. How much money did Mary
earn for that session?

3. Billy correctly processed 730 checks during a session. How much money did Billy
earn for that session?
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Appendix E
Informed Consent Documents

WESTFRN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY

H. S. I. R. B.
•Approved (cr use fcr one year frcm tfis date:

AUG 1 3 Z007
Western Michigan University
Department of Psychology

>JH$RB C $ i r

The Effects of Pay on the Performance of a Data Entry Task
Principal Investigator: Alyce M. Dickinson, Ph.D.
Student Investigator: Julie M. Slowiak, M.A.
I have been invited to participate in a research study designed to determine the effects of hourly
pay on the performance of a data entry task. The study is Julie Slowiak's dissertation project. Dr.
Alyce Dickinson is her advisor.
Eligibility requirements. In order to be eligible to participate in this study, I must play computer
games at least one hour per week and must not be enrolled in or have completed either PSY
3440: Organizational Psychology, PSY 4440: Industrial/Organizational Behavior Analysis, or
PSY 4600: Survey of Behavior Analysis Research. I also must pass a quiz that tests my
understanding of the pay system after it has been explained to me, and be able to attend four 45minute sessions in a two-week period of time.
Explanation of study procedures and length of participation. I will perform a computerized data
entry task. Simulated bank Checks will be displayed on the computer screen, and I will type the
numeric amounts of the checks using the computer keyboard. Each session will be 45 minutes,
and I will attend 4 sessions over a 2-week period.
Payment. I will receive $5.75 for today's introductory session. I will also be paid $5.75 for
attending a session during which my keyboard skills will be assessed, and $5,75 for attending
each of the next 3 experimental sessions. If I decide that I do not Want to continue my
participation after today's session or do not meet all of the participation requirements, I will be
paid $5.75 for attending today's introductory session before I leave. If I agree to participate and
meet the participation requirements, I will receive payment for all sessions when the entire study
has been completed. If I decide to withdraw from the study before it is over, I will be paid the
amount of money that I earned for the Sessions I attended.
Risks. I may experience some physical discomfort, minor fatigue, or stress when I am
performing the data entry task. This will be offset because I will be able to take breaks whenever
I want to during the session. When I take a break, I may play computer games that are on the
computer or simply relax.
Benefits. I may learn about research regarding the effects of pay on work performance. The data
obtained from this study will help determine how pay systems affect the performance of
individuals. This knowledge may allow businesses to design better pay systems.
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Confidentiality, All information obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential. When
results of the study are presented publicly, I will not be identified. I will be assigned a number
and that number will be used to identify my data.
Voluntary participation. My participation in this study is completely voluntary. I may withdraw
at any time without penalty. If I do withdraw, I will receive the money I earned for the sessions I
attended. My participation in the study, of my withdrawal from the study, will not affect my
grades in any of my courses. At the end of the study, the experimenter will answer any questions
I have and explain how my data will help to learn more about pay systems.
Who to contact if I have questions. If I have any questions about this study, I may contact Julie
Slowiak at julie.slowiak@wmich.edu. I may also call Julie's faculty advisor, Dr. Dickinson, at
269-387-4473. In addition, I can also call the chair of Western Michigan University's Human
Subjects Review Board at 269-387-8293, or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298, if
questions or problems arise during the course of the study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the Board Chair in
the upper right hand corner. Participants should not sign this document if the corner does not
have a stamped date and signature.
My signature below indicates that I have read the above information and agree to
participate in this study.

Participant Signature:

Date:

Please keep the attached copy of this form for your records.
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Western Michigan University
Department of Psychology
The Effects of Pay on the Performance of a Data Entry Task
Principal Investigator: Alyce M. Dickinson, Ph.D.
Student Investigator: Julie M. Slowiak, M.A.
I have been invited to participate in a research study designed to determine the effects of
individual monetary incentive pay on the performance of a data entry task. The study is Julie
Slowiak's dissertation project. Dr. Alyce Dickinson is her advisor.
Eligibility requirements. In order to be eligible to participate in this study, I must play computer
games at least one hour per week and must not be enrolled in or have completed either PSY
3440: Organizational Psychology, PSY 4440: Industrial/Organizational Behavior Analysis, or
PSY 4600: Survey of Behavior Analysis Research. I also must pass a quiz that tests my
understanding of the pay system after it has been explained to me, and be able to attend four 45minute sessions in a two-week period of time.
Explanation of study procedures and length of participation. I will perform a computerized data
entry task. Simulated bank checks will be displayed on the computer screen, and I will type the
numeric amounts of the checks using the computer keyboard. Each session will be 45 minutes,
and I will attend 4 sessions over a 2-week period.
Payment. 1 will receive $5.75 for today's introductory session. I will also be paid $5.75 for
attending a session during which my keyboard skills will be assessed. During the 3 experimental
sessions, I will earn incentives based on my performance of the data entry task. It is likely that I
will earn between $4.00 and $8.00 per session, but the exact amount will depend upon my
performance of the task. For every correctly processed check, I will earn $0,007. If I decide that I
do not want to continue my participation after today's session or do not meet all of the
participation requirements, I will be paid $5.75 for attending today's introductory session before
I leave. If I agree to participate and meet the participation requirements, I will receive payment
for all sessions when the entire study has been completed. If I decide to withdraw from the study
before it is over, I will be paid the amount of money that I earned for the sessions I attended.
Risks. I may experience some physical discomfort, minor fatigue, or stress when I am
performing the data entry task. This will be offset because I will be able to take breaks whenever
I want to during the session. When I take a break, I may play computer games that are on the
computer or simply relax.
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Benefits. I may learn about research regarding the effects of pay on work performance. The data
obtained from this study will help determine how pay systems affect the performance of
individuals. This knowledge may allow businesses to design better pay systems.
Confidentiality. All information obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential. When
results of the study are presented publicly, I will not be identified. I will be assigned a number
and that number will be used to identify my data.
Voluntary participation. My participation in this study is completely voluntary. I may withdraw
at any time without penalty. If I do withdraw, I will receive the money I earned for the sessions I
attended. My participation in the study, or my withdrawal from the study, will not affect my
grades in any of my courses. At the end of the study, the experimenter will answer any questions
I have and explain how my data will help to learn more about pay systems.
Who to contact if I have questions. If I have any questions about this study, I may contact Julie
Slowiak at julie.slowiak@wmich.edu. I may also call Julie's faculty advisor, Dr. Dickinson, at
269-387-4473. In addition, I can also call the chair of Western Michigan University's Human
Subjects Review Board at 269-387-8293, or the Vice President for Research at 269-387-8298, if
questions or problems arise during the course of the study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the Board Chair in
the upper right hand corner. Participants should not sign this document if the corner does not
have a stamped date and signature.
My signature below indicates that I have read the above information and agree to
participate in this study.

Participant Signature:

Date:

Please keep the attached copy of this form for your records:
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Date: August 13,2007
To:

Alyce Dickinson, Principal Investigator
Julie Slowiak, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D.,(chair / f f l V

HUl

f~

Re:
HSIRB Project Number: 07-07-23
This letter will serve as confirmation that your research project entitled "Self-Solicited
Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay has been
approved under the expedited category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional
Review Board. The conditions and duration of this approval are specified in the Policies
of Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as
described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this proj ect. You must also
seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the termination date noted below. In
addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or unanticipated events
associated with the conduct of this research, you should immediately suspend the project
and contact the Chair of the HSIRB for consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.

ApprovalTermination:

August 13,2008

Walwood Hall, Kalamazoo, Ml 49008-5456
PHONE; (263) 387-8293 FAX; (269) 387-8276
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MTQ Participant Instructions and Sample Items
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Self-Description Questionnaire
INSTRUCTIONS:

This questionnaire asks you to respond to statements about your attitudes, opinions,
and behaviors. Read each statement carefully, and decide whether or not the
statement describes you. Using the scale at the top of each page indicate the degree
to which the ENTIRE statement is true of you. Give only one answer for each
statement.
Some of the statements may refer to experiences you may not have had. Respond
to these statements in terms of how true you think it WOULD BE of you.
Look at the sample statement below.
SAMPLE STATEMENT:
I

•
Very
UNTRUE
of Me

2

3

4

5

•

•

•

•

•

UNTRUE
of Me

Somewhat
UNTRUE
of Me

Somewhat
TRUE
of Me

TRUE
of Me

Very
TRUE
of Me

6

I like to go to parties.
MARK

1^
2 "^
3 "^
4 "^
5 -^
6 -^

if you really dislike parties and you try to avoid them.
if you generally dislike parties and only go when you have to.
if you think parties are okay but generally prefer not to go.
if you think parties are okay and generally prefer to go.
if you generally like parties and go to most of the time.
if you really like parties and only miss one if you absolutely have to.

PLEASE NOTE:
• There are no right or wrong answers. Simply describe yourself honestly and
state your opinions accurately.
• In deciding on your answer, consider your life in general and not only the last
few weeks or months.
• Deciding on an answer may be difficult for some of the statements. If you
have a hard time deciding, choose the answer that is MOST true of you.
• Some of the items will seem repetitive. These are not meant to be trick
questions. Do not look back at your previous answers, simply answer each
question honestly.

Do N O T TURN T O THE NEXT PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE TOLD T O D O S O

75
Larger sample ofMTQ items:
1. When I become interested a task, I try to learn as much about it as I can.
2. I like to take on task assignments that challenge me.
3. If I already do something well, I don't see the need to challenge myself to do better.
4. I strive to do my job better than the people I work with.
5. It is important for me to outperform my co-workers.
6. I compare my performance to that of others.
7. I try to avoid competitive situations.
8. Even in non-competitive situations, I find ways to compete with others.
9. When working on important tasks, I get concerned that I will make a mistake.
10.1 worry about the possibility of failure or poor performance.
11. My heart beats fast before I begin difficult tasks.
12.1 am able to remain calm and relaxed in stressful situations.
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Appendix H
Screen Shot of Check Program
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Check Verify Software

'John D o e ,•

"".p^'totba James Long

.$: 211.34

Two hundred eleven and 34/100 *****************

Dollars
John Doe

Memq
| : 0 8 8 6 7 8 9 1 : | 12312120312 311

Enter the amount in the check shown above:
Enter ond» numbers and decimal [example 150.77)

K t A Check »
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Appendix I
Post-Session Data Recording Form
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Data Recording Form
Participant Number:
Pay Condition: Hourly / Incentive

Cl

Date

C2

C3

C4

Session

# of Times
"Feedback"
Button
Pressed

Time off
Task
(s/60=min)

C5
Time
on
Task
(45C4)

C6

C7

C8

C9

Total #
Checks
Complete

#
Checks
Correct

%
Correct
(C7/C6)

Rate
(C6/C5)

Intro
Pre-test
Exp 1
Exp 2
Exp 3

Total Amount Earned

Directions for calculating amounts for CIO: Amount Earned
(1) Introductory session: all participants earn $5.75
(2) Pre-test session: all participants earn $5.75
(2) Experimental sessions:
- Hourly condition - participants in this condition earn $5.75 for each session
- Incentive condition - for participants in this condition, use pay chart

CIO
Amt
Earned
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Appendix J
Instructional Script: Hourly Pay Condition
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Hourly Pay Condition
I want to remind you that you will earn $5.75 for this session and the next 2
sessions, and that I will pay you in cash at the end of the study. I will also tell you how
many checks you completed correctly during each session at the end of the study.
However, if you would like to receive immediate feedback on your performance of the
experimental task at any time during the session, you can use the computer mouse to
press the "Feedback" button on menu bar of the check program. When you press this
button, you will receive feedback on the following: (1) the current number of checks
completed, (2) the current number of checks completed correctly, and (3) the current rate
of check completion, which is updated every 30 seconds. You can also get feedback by
using the Alt+F command on the keyboard. The feedback dialogue box will remain on
the screen until you click the "OK" button on the dialogue box or until the "Enter" key is
pressed on the keyboard.
Once again, please leave your personal belongings (including your cell phone or
pager) and books in this room. You may take a break whenever you like for as long as
you like. You may play one of the computer games as a break, or you may also just
stretch and relax. After I start the check task in the experimental room, I will leave the
room and be in the laboratory room across the hall. If you need anything during the
session, just come get me. Do you have any questions?"
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Appendix K
Instructional Script: Monetary Incentive Pay Condition
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Individual Monetary Incentive Pay Condition
I want to remind you that you will earn $.007 for each check you complete
correctly, and that I will pay you in cash at the end of the study. I will also tell you how
many checks you completed correctly during each session at the end of the study.
However, if you would like to receive immediate feedback on your performance of the
experimental task at any time during the session, you can use the computer mouse to
press the "Feedback" button on menu bar of the check program. When you press this
button, you will receive feedback on the following: (1) the current number of checks
completed, (2) the current number of checks completed correctly, and (3) the current rate
of check completion, which is updated every 30 seconds. You can also get feedback by
using the Alt+F command on the keyboard. The feedback dialogue box will remain on
the screen until you click the "OK" button on the dialogue box or until the "Enter" key is
pressed on the keyboard.
Once again, please leave your personal belongings (including your cell phone or
pager) and books in this room. You may take a break whenever you like for as long as
you like. You may play one of the computer games as a break, or you may also just
stretch and relax. After I start the check task in the experimental room, I will leave the
room and be in this room. If you need anything during the session, just come get me. Do
you have any questions?"
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Appendix L
End of Study: Participant Feedback Forms

85
Participant Feedback Form: Hourly Pay System
Participant Number:

Session
Number

Session Date

Number of
Checks

Number of
Correct Checks

# of Times
Feedback
Button was
Pressed

TOTALSPAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION;
$5.75 FOR INTRODUCTORY SESSION

$5.75

$5.75 FOR KEYBOARD ASSESSMENT SESSION

$5.75

PAY FOR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS ($5.75 X 3 SESSIONS)
TOTAL PAY

$17.25
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Participant Feedback Form: Monetary Incentive Pay System
Participant Number:

Session
Number

Session
Date

Number
of
Checks

Number
of Correct
Checks

Amount of
Incentive Pay Earned
(use pay chart)

# of Times
Feedback Button
was Pressed

1

TOTALS-

PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION:
$5.75 FOR INTRODUCTORY SESSION

$5.75

$5.75 FOR KEYBOARD ASSESSMENT SESSION

$5.75

PAY FOR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS
(Amount of incentive pay earned for all 3 sessions)
TOTAL PAY
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Appendix M
Post-Study Participant Questionnaire
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Post-Study Participant Questionnaire

Participant Number:

Please complete the following questions. All information you provide will remain
confidential.

1. What did you think this study was about?

2. Did you know that some of the other participants were paid differently? If so, how
and when did you discover that?

3. Did you set any performance goals during the study? If so, what were they?

4. Did you use the feedback feature of the computer task to obtain immediate
performance feedback during any of the experimental sessions?
If you did not use the feedback feature, was there a reason why you did not use this
feature?

If you did use the feedback feature, why did you use this feature?

5. If you used the feedback feature, did you like having the option to obtain feedback
and was the feedback you received helpful?
6. Would you have preferred to have received some other type of feedback during the
study, other that what was available to you?

7. If you used the feedback feature, do you feel the feedback provided increased your
performance?

8. If you used the feedback feature AND set goals, did the feedback cause you to set
goals?
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Appendix N
Debriefing Script
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Debriefing Script
Following the last session of participation:
1.

Thank you for participating in this study.

2.

I would like to explain the purpose of the study to you.
The purpose of this study was to compare the effects of individual monetary
incentives and hourly pay on self-solicited feedback and on the performance of
the experimental task. What this means is that I was interested in comparing the
number of times individuals pressed the "Feedback" button during experimental
sessions under the two different pay conditions. Additionally, I was interested in
comparing the number of checks correctly completed under both pay conditions.
You were one of the participants who [did, did not] receive incentives.
The computer games were available because we believe that without incentives
individuals may spend more time performing non-work activities, which would
decrease the number of checks completed and also affect the number of times
individuals solicited feedback. Thus, we included them as activities that you
might play instead of working on the check task.

3.

(Give the participant the form that indicates the number of checks he/she
completed and number of times he/she solicited feedback each session). This form
indicates the number of checks that you processed correctly during each session
and the number of times you solicited feedback on your performance during each
session. As you can see, you processed a total of
checks and solicited
feedback a total of
times during the entire study. Because you earned
[$.007 per check, $5.75 a session, regardless of the number of checks you
completed correctly], your [pay totaled]
.

4. Do you have any questions about this study or your participation?
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Appendix O
Pay Chart

Pay Scale for Monetary incentive Condition ($0.007/check)
# Checks
100-104
105-111
112-118
119-125
126-132
133-139
140-146
1 * f / "' 1 «ZJ*T

155-161
162-168
169-175
176-182
183-189
190-196
197-204
205-211
212-218
219-225
226-232
233-239
240-246
247-254
255-261
262-268
269-275
276-282
283-289
290-296
297-304
305-311
312-318
319-325
326-332
333-339
340-346
0*T / "O0*T

355-361
362-368
369-375
376-382
383-389
390-396
397-404
405-411
412-418
419-425
426-432
433-439
440-446
447-454

Pay
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

•IIS # Checks
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
1.30
1.35
1.40
1.45
1.50
1.55
1.60
1.65
1.70
1.75
1.80
1.85
1.90
1.95
2.00
2.05
2.10
2.15
2.20
2.25
2.30
2.35
2.40
2.45
2.50
2.55
2.60
2.65
2.70
2.75
2.80
2.85
2.90
2.95
3.00
3.05
3.10
3.15

455-461
462-468
469-475
476-482
483-489
490-496
•TV.*
497-504
505-511
512-518
519-525
526-532
533-539
540-546
547-554
!§*
555-561
562-568
569-575
tv'§? 576-582
583-589
590-596
597-604
605-611
612-618
619-625
626-632
633-639
640-646
647-654
655-661
662-668
669-675
676-682
683-689
690-696
| | | 697-704
705-711
^ ' 712-718
719-725
726-732
733-739
740-746
747-754
j^M 755-761
iiii? 762-768
769-775
?«| 776-782
11121783-789
790-796
797-804
805-811

1

ill

n
iffP

£*&£f*$&

i

ips

Pay
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

3.20
3.25
3.30
3.35
3.40
3.45
3.50
3.55
3.60
3.65
3.70
3.75
3.80
3.85
3.90
3.95
4.00
4.05
4.10
4.15
4.20
4.25
4.30
4.35
4.40

Cp

*r.*fO

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

4.50
4.55
4.60
4.65
4.70
4.75
4.80
4.85
4.90
4.95
5.00
5.05
5.10
5.15
5.20
5.25
5.30
5.35
5.40
5.45
5.50
5.55
5.60
5.65

#Checks
812-818
819-825
826-832
833-839
840-846
847-854
855-861
862-868
869-875
876-882
883-889
890-896
897-904
905-911
912-918
919-925
926-932
933-939
940-946
1 ? * T / ™v?H/*r

955-961
962-968
969-975
976-982
983-989
990-996
997-1004
1005-1011
1012-1018
1019-1025
1026-1032
1033-1039
1040-1046
1047-1054
1055-1061
1062-1068
1069-1075
1076-1082
1083-1089
1090-1096
1097-1004
1005-1011
1012-1018
1019-1025
1026-1032
1033-1039
1040-1046
1047-1054
1055-1061
1062-1068

Pay
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

5.70
5.75
5.80
5.85
5.90
5.95
6.00
6.05
6.10
6.15
6.20
6.25
6.30
6.35
6.40
6.45
6.50
6.55
6.60
6.65
6.70
6.75
6.80
6.85
6.90
6.95
7.00
7.05
7.10
7.15
7.20
7.25
7.30
7.35
7.40
7.45
7.50
7.55
7.60
7.65
7.70
7.75
7.80
7.85
7.90
7.95
8.00
8.05
8.10
8.15

